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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 





DAN STEW_A.RT COMPANY, 
INC., and O_A.N STEW ART, 
Defendants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ST~A. TEMENT OF FACT 
Case No. 
9266 
This is an action filed by Plaintiff to recover $9,068.28, 
with interest on a contract for certain commercial phono--
graph machines. 
By stipulation Defendants admitted the owing of the 
debt, but allege by way of counterclaim, that Plaintiff and 
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Defendants entered into a written agreement (Exhibit 1 .. ) 
which was breached by Plaintiff to Defendants' damage in 
the sum of $50,000.00. 
Defendants were prepared to prove the damages on the 
counterclaim when Plaintiff made a motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, based on he files and records 
herein and the deposition of Dan B. Stewart. 
The motion was argued, submitted and briefs supplied 
by both sides. Thereafter, the Court granted the motion 
and dismissed Defendants' counterclaim. It is from this 
summary judgment that this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Court erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. 
2. The Court erred in entering its judgment and order 
dismussing Defendants' counterclaim. {T r. 35) 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
1. It is the position of Defendants that the agreement 
entered into created an exclusive distributors' agreement, 
which was breached by Plaintiff's permitting others to sell 
its product in the area therein defined. (Exh. 1) 
2. It is further the position of Defendants that the 
ruling of the trial Court enforces the agreement without 
mutuality; that the condition therein binding upon De .. 
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fendants was by said ruling not binding upon Plaintiff, 
and therefore lacking in mutuality. 
ARGUMENT 
We must consider in this case whether or not the con--
tract (Exhibit 1) was an exclusive distributors agreement. 
As will appear from the other agreements of previous years 
(Exhibit 2), the word "exclusive" was used but was de--
leted by this year's agreement. 
It is our position that the agreement itself (Exhibit 1) 
created an exclusive distributors agreement, by the fol--
lowing: (a) the territory in which Stewart might sell is 
defined. (b) Stewart's guarantee to purchase 96 machines 
during the year as set forth in par. 5. (c) Stewart's agree--
ment to follow policies and practices relative to prices and 
delivery of sales as prepared by Rock--Ola in paragraph 14; 
(d) Stewart's promise that he will "not sell, solicit or 
receive orders for any products manufactured by any com--
pany other than Rock--Ola, which competes with Rock--
Ola Equipment, whether current year or prior year equip--
ment" - par. 22. 
"Whether or not a principal who has contracted to 
pay an agent compensation if the agent is successful in 
accomplishing a definite result promises that he will not 
compete with the agent, either personally or through an--
other agent, depends upon the manifestation of the parties 
interpreted in light of the circumstances to which the 
manifestations are made." Restatement of the Law Agency 
~449. 
In 126 i-\LR 1225 Navy Gas & Supply Co. vs. A. A. 
Schoench, Colo.--98 P.2nd 860 ( 1940) at p. 1229. Under 
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date of the contract, by letter Defendant advised Plaintiff: 
''As a means of clarification the tank wagon area of 
Golden, Colo., is defined as follows: Jefferson County 
with the exception of the S. W. comer which is now being 
served by the Morrison Auto Supply Co. This will clarify 
the situation to such an extent that there will be no mis--
understanding as to the area you are to serve." By this 
language of limitation the amendment clearly imports that 
the Plaintiff should not be allowed to sell Defendants' 
products outside the sharply defined area indicated and 
implies exclusiveness therein. Upon the principle approved 
by us in Baird vs. Baird, 48 Colo. 506, Ill P. 79 Hinkle 
vs. Blinn, 92 Colo. 302, 19 P. 2nd 1038, and other similar 
cases, that the practical interpretation given to the con--
tract by the parties while engaged in its performance and 
before any controversy has arisen is one of the best indi .. 
cations of their true intent, the Plaintiff, as demonstrative 
of the exclusive agency construction, introduced evidence 
to the effect that previously upon at least six occasions 
he was paid commission by Defendant upon sales made 
directly to it to construction contractors and to govern--
mental agencies in Plaintiff's territory. 
Under the terms of the agency agreement, vie\ved in the 
light of the surrounding circumstances, as well as the man--
ner of its interpretation by the parties, we are of the 
opinion that the trial Court did not err in instructing the 
Jury as it did on the legal effect of the conract. The fact 
that it provides that the commissions were to be paid upon 
such products as are sold by second party and on gasoline 
and kerosene delivered by him, is not compatible with the 
exclusive agency interpretation, since if that construction 
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is accorded, no one other than Plaintiff had authority to 
sell or deliver Defendants' products in the area. In the 
case before us Plaintiff was precluded from doing these 
things by the assumption of this authority by Defendant. 
It is well settled that the grant of an "exclusive" agency 
to sell, i.e. exclusive right to sell the products of a whole..-
sale dealer in a specified territory ordinarily is interpreted 
as precluding competition by the principal in any form 
within the area. 
The Court held in White Co. vs. Farley & Co., 219 
Ky. 66, 292 SW 472 ... 52, ALR 541..-1927: "A sales agency 
contract which assigns the agent certain territory, outside 
of which he is not allowed to operate in the sale of the 
principal's motor cars, which requires him to handle no 
cars or parts, except those manufactured by the principal, 
and which allows the agent a bonus commission depending 
upon the amount of his total cash sales, confers an ex ... 
elusive agency, although it does not specifically so pro..-
vide." The contract appears to have been prepared by 
appellant, and does not specifically provide that it is an 
exclusive contract. Its provisions, as a whole however, are 
inconsistent with any other view. It not only definitely fixes 
the area in which appellee is authorized to sell its trucks, 
but the agent is expressly required not to sell any of Ap ... 
pellant's trucks outside of or to be sold outside of the 
designated territory, and provides that if the agent violates 
this provision, the company may immediately cancel the 
contract. It requires the agent to handle no other com..-
mercial motor cars except those manufactured by appel ... 
lant, and to handle no parts for White Commercial Motor 
cars, except those manufactured by appellant. It further 
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provides for the allowance to the agent for an additional 
discount called a bonus commission, based upon the net 
amount paid on or before the expiration of the contract, 
the amount of the bonus commission depending upon the 
total cash sales during the existence of the contract; and 
that additional discount is based partially "upon the price 
the purchaser would have paid hereunder for all standard 
models of new commercial car chassis above enumerated 
delivered by the White Company and used in the territory 
in which the purchaser (agent) hereunder sells White 
Commercial Motor cars. 
Clearly, under these provisions the contract was, in .. 
tended to be and was considered by the parties, as ex.-
clusive agency during its term, and there is no contention 
in appellant's brief that it was otherwise, it being virtually 
conceded that appellant, during the life of the conract had 
no right to invade that territory and sell its trucks so as 
to deprive appellee of his contract commission." 
In the present case we therefore take the position that 
the contract gave to Stewart an exclusive distributorship. 
The other agreements for previous years, introduced and 
received at the pre ... trial, used the word "Exclusive" dis.-
tributor. The word "exclusive" was deleted from the 1959 
contract. However, the 1959 distributor's agreement was 
and is by its terms an exclusive agreement even though 
the word "exclusive" has been deleted. 
The deposition of Dan Stewart shows in 1959 Rock.-Ola 
sold machines to B & G Sales, a competitor of Stewart, and 
that although the machines were shipped to Uni.-Con in 
Wichita, Kansas, they were immediately sent to B & G 
sales in Salt Lake City and financed by Rock ... Ola (Stewart's 
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Deposition p. 6). Based on recorded chattel mortgages we 
were prepared to show that the machines sold in this man ... 
ner were new machines. This conduct continued all 
through the year, 1958. Our evidence would have shown, 
had we been permitted to go on trial, that on several occa ... 
sions Stewart complained and Plaintiff's representatives 
promised to look into the matter and stop the B & G sales. 
Uni Con was a disributor working out of Wichita, 
Kansas and was selling in Stewart's territory with financ ... 
ing help from Plaintiff. 
This practice continued into 1959 and on January 29, 
1959, Mr. Stewart wrote a letter informing Plaintiff that 
he was being seriously handicapped in carrying out the 
provisions of his agreement relative to a certain quota of 
sales. {Stewart Deposition p. 7 ... 8) 
Thereafter, Plaintiff not only failed to stop the Uni ... 
Con Sales to B & G but financed them. Further, Plaintiff 
failed to ship the machines after Defendants sent in sales 
orders. Defendants were required to purchase machines 
to fill orders from B & G Sales at their price. 
We were prepared to show further that on July 1st, 
1959, Mr. Stewart was informed by a letter which he 
finally received July 7th, 1959, that "because of your failure 
to maintain said quota for each of said two quarterly 
periods, and to purchase at least said number of phono ... 
graphs and said amount of accessories, during each of said 
two quarterly periods, (provided in paragraph 5 of Dis ... 
tributor's Agreement, Exh. 1) the undersigned Rock ... Ola 
Mfg. Corp. pursuant to Par. 6 of said Distributor's Agree ... 
ment will, 15 days from date hereof terminate said Dealer's 
Agreement." (Dan Stewart Dep. p. 21) 
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Mr. Stewart further testified that at the time of the 
termination he had in excess of $6,000.00 in parts for the 
machines, (Stewart Dep. p. 18) and that he lost $6,000.00 
or $7,000.00 in sales because he was unable to deliver the 
machines. 
Mr. R. }. Baker, in his deposition (p. 7) testified that 
the machines which he purchased were financed through 
Rock--Ola and that payments were made directly to Rock 
Ole from B & G Sales in Salt Lake City. 
Mr. Stewart in his depositon also testified that Rock .. 
Ola financed the machines for B & G (16 Stewart Dep.) 
We will show from the serial numbers that the rna .. 
chines sold by B & G Sales were new current models. Some 
of these machines were routed through Uni--Con in Wi .. 
chita, while some of them were shipped directly to Salt 
Lake City from Rock--Ola. Stewart purchased one of these 
machines and saw the label and serial numbers on the other 
(Stewart Dep. p. 11--12) 
Plaintiff in this case does not appear before this Court 
asking relief with clean hands. Plaintiff has deliberately 
misled Defendant on its past transactions and has gone 
out of its way to put Stewart out of business. Mr. Stewart 
testifed (Dep. p. 23) that: "when you receive a distributor--
ship from a factory like Rock--Ola that you have the terri--
tory allotted to you and they will work with you and 
protect you every way they can, and keep other people 
from infringing on your territory; and that is the oral 
part of it. 
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A. Well that is a practice of the business. For in--
stance, all customers - if they want Rock--Ola Services -
they come to the distributor, that is the disributor for 
Rock ... Ola to get it. If they want Seeburg service, they go to 
a Seeburg Distributor to get it." 
We come now to the further consideration of the lack 
of mutuality contained in the agreement (Exhibit 1). 
2 Am. Jur. 44 Sec. 4 7: Whether or not a party to an 
agency may recover damages for a breach of contract 
based upon the wrongful termination of the agency de--
pends, of course, on whether there is a valid obligation 
of such nature existing between the parties, which question 
in turn depends in some cases on whether there is any 
mutuality of obligation between the parties. 
Hutchings vs. Stevenson 148 ALR 1320, 141 Tex, 
448--178 sw 2d 487. 
Naify vs. Pac. Suden Co. 115 ALR 4 76, 11 Cal. 2d 5, 
76 Pac. 2d 663. 
A contract must have mutuality of obligation, and an 
agreement which permits one party to withdraw at his 
pleasure is void. 
Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Clarbourne .. Rene Co., 
89 ALR 238, 64 Fed. 224: "The rule which requires 
mutuality of obligation with respect to contracts to be per ... 
formed in the future where the promise of one party con..-
stitutes the sole consideration for the promise of the other 
arises from the inherent unfairness of enforcing a contract 
which requires performance by one of the parties while 
leaving the other party free to accept or reject performance. 
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In Hoffman vs. P/ingston ( 1951) 260 Wic. 160, 50 
NW 2nd 360, 26 ALR 2d 1131, the Court held that the 
rule that an agreement to supply a buyer according to 
the requirements of his business is sufficiently definite as 
to quantity to be enforceable is inapplicable to render valid 
a contract lacking mutuality because of the absence of a 
corresponding duty of the Buyer to order. 
THE COURT: ''The named standard being gone we 
do not see how Pfingsten could have appealed to another 
which the parties had never referred to, either in the 
original or in the modified agreement, and this is particu .. 
larly so where Hoffman had no obligation to give all his 
time to "Old Tanner" nor to prosecute its development 
vigorously but was permitted by the contract to engage in 
another business which did not deal in products similar 
to "Old Tanner". 
"Our conclusions that the contract as modified lacks 
mutuality and is therefore void makes it necessary to con ... 
sider propostions that Pfingsten may end it at will because 
its duration is indefinite. The argument has much force 
and was resolved in Pfingsten's favor by the trial Court, 
but the solution is not necessary to our determination." 
In the present case there is a duty imposed upon the 
Defendants to sell in the territory defined in the contract 
(Ex h. 1). There was also a duy on the part of Plaintiff 
to perform under the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the circumstances \Ve submit that Defendants 
did have an exclusive distributorship; that Plaintiff's con ... 
duct resulted in Defendants' failure to produce under the 
10 
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contract. Defendants had done business with Plaintiff for 
a number of years and had had the exclusive franchise 
during that time. 
Plaintiff had to this point successfully avoided any 
liability under the contract and has caused the loss which 
Defendants set forth in their counterclaim, by merely 
deleting therefrom the word "Exclusive." (Exh. 1) 
Respectfully Submitted, 
LAMAR DUNCAN 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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